University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 2010

Article 11

2010

The Decriminalization Option: Should States
Consider Moving from a Criminal to a Civil Drug
Court Model?
Alex Kreit

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Kreit, Alex (2010) "The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?,"
University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2010, Article 11.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2010/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

The Decriminalization Option:
Should States Consider Moving
from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?
Alex Kreit t

INTRODUCTION

As states look to shave their corrections budgets in the midst
of the recession, many are thinking about options to reform what
is widely considered to be a bloated and ineffective approach to
drug policy. While the effort to move beyond failed drug war policies and adopt smarter and more cost-effective measures is a positive step, the policy debate has focused almost exclusively on
traditional and well-worn reform ideas. Many states and localities have, for example, begun to explore dramatically increasing
the use of criminal drug courts, which available evidence indicates may be both cheaper and more effective than current policies. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has pledged to significantly boost federal drug court grants as part of its effort to
place a greater emphasis on treatment in our national drug control strategy. Even some of the more envelope-pushing reform
proposals gaining traction in some states, like taxing and regulating marijuana, are new only in their political viability and not
in their approach. Of course, the fact that ideas are not new does
not mean they are not good. In examining options for lowering
costs and improving drug policy, however, states and localities
may also benefit from thinking outside the box and looking at
approaches outside of the United States in order to generate new
ideas.
In that spirit, this Article will consider an innovative drug
law from overseas that has thus far garnered relatively little attention in the political dialogue, or among legal academics, with-
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University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium for providing helpful information and
comments on earlier drafts.
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in the United States': Portugal's 2001 drug decriminalization
measure. I will argue that states looking for smart, cost-saving
drug policy measures should contemplate adopting a system similar to Portugal's, which removes drug users from the criminal
sphere entirely in favor of what we might think of as a civil drug
court system. This approach, I will contend, would address some
of the lingering inefficiencies that are inherent in the criminal
drug court model that has risen to prominence here in the United
States.
In Part I of this Article, I provide a brief overview of the
drug war's impact on state and local budgets and look at some of
the proposals for reform that have gained the greatest attention
among policy makers and politicians in recent years. Part II focuses on one of the most broadly supported reform ideas: criminal drug courts. I will argue that criminal drug courts, while
likely superior to our current system, suffer from a handful of
key inefficiencies that cause them to be less cost-effective than
other possible alternatives. I will further argue that many of
these inefficiencies are the result of placing drug courts within
the criminal justice system. In Part III, I will turn to Portugal's
drug decriminalization law, which removed all criminal penalties
for drug possession and use in personal amounts and established
a noncriminal drug treatment (or, as I will refer to it, "civil drug
court") system. I will consider how such a system compares to the
United States' criminal drug court model and contend that a decriminalized model like Portugal's would be likely to produce better results and at a lower cost than criminal drug courts.
I. THE DRUG WAR'S IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS

By any measure, spending on prisons and law enforcement
has grown exponentially over the past three decades. The combined expenditures of local governments, state governments, and
the federal government on corrections and law enforcement now
totals approximately $200 billion annually, more than four times
2
what we spent (in constant dollars) just twenty-five years ago.
State corrections budgets alone have increased more than 300
1 One prominent exception to the relative lack of attention paid to Portugal's drug
decriminalization law within the United States is Glenn Greenwald's excellent 2009
report for the CATO Institute. See Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalizationin Portugal: Lessons for CreatingFair and Successful Drug Policies (The CATO Institute White
Paper 2009), online at http/www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapersgreenwaldwhitepaper.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010).
2 Glenn C. Loury, Race, Incarceration,and American Values 5 (MIT 2008).
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percent over the past twenty years, to approximately $52 billion
a year. 3 This increase has outpaced growth in spending for nearly all other essential services-including education, transportation, and public assistance-over the same time period, with
Medicaid as the sole exception. 4 And, within the area of corrections budgets, spending on prisons, as opposed to probation and
parole programs, has accounted for roughly 90 percent of the new
5
funding.
Similarly, by any measure, our punitive drug policies (in the
form of the so-called "war on drugs") have been a leading cause of
the explosion in our corrections budgets and prison population.
Nearly one-quarter of the 2.3 million Americans in prison are
there because of a drug offense. Indeed, the number of Americans
incarcerated for drug offenses today is larger than the entire
prison and jail population was in 1980.6
The total cost of our drug policies, in terms of government
spending, is notoriously difficult to measure. This is in large part
because there are so many moving parts, many of which cannot
easily be quantified. 7 Indeed, estimates even for costs that may
appear relatively straightforward to measure at first glance,
such as how much money drug arrests cost state and local governments, can vary widely. This is because arrest figures generally do not distinguish between "stand-alone" drug arrests, in
which a drug violation is the reason for the arrest, and incidental
drug arrests, in which the drug charge is incidental to an arrest
for some other crime. 8 All this is to say that to describe spending
estimates in this area as imprecise and heavily debated would be
an understatement.
3 The Pew Center on the States, One in Thirty-One: The Long Reach of American
Corrections 11 (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2009), online at http/www.pewcenter
onthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_lin3lreportFINALWEB_3-26-09.pdf (visited Oct
3, 2010).
4 Id. See also John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U Chi Legal
F 73 (discussing state expenditures on prisons).
5 See Pew Center, One in Thirty-One at 12 (cited in note 3).
6 Alex Kreit, Toward a Public Health Approach to Drug Policy, 3 Advance: J ACS
Issue Groups 43, 43 n 5 (2009).
7 Erik Luna, Drug Ditente, 20 Fed Sent Rep 304, 305 (2008) ("Frankly, however,
calculating the aggregate expense of prohibition may be an impossible task, given the
myriad areas of spending and the disinterest of drug warriors in revealing the actual cost
of their crusade.").
8 Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of Drug Prohibition 5-6 (2008),
online at http/www.economics.harvard.edu/ faculty/mirorVfiles/budget_2008.pdf (visited
Oct 3, 2010) (explaining the difficulty of distinguishing between "stand-alone" and incidental arrests, and noting that estimates of "stand-alone" arrests have varied from 33
percent to 85 percent).
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With that disclaimer in mind, one of the more recent efforts
to estimate the impact of drug laws on state budgets, a 2008 paper by Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron, can help to provide at
least a broad sense of the numbers. Miron, who deliberately employed assumptions in his analysis that erred on the conservative side, found that the annual net state and local expenditures
for drug prohibition, after subtracting revenue for seizures and
fines, are about $30 billion overall, with $10 billion for marijuana
law enforcement alone.9 Net federal expenditures, meanwhile,
stand at around $15 billion annually. 10 Whatever dollar estimate
one finds most persuasive, however, there is little doubt that
drug enforcement spending today consumes a significant percentage of our corrections and law enforcement resources.
In addition to direct expenses, the criminalization of drug
use carries significant collateral costs, including the removal of
drug offenders who are lawfully employed from the labor market,
the erosion of relationships between the community and law enforcement, and broken families.11 There are also, of course, opportunity costs associated with drug-enforcement spending. 12 A
number of empirical studies have found that increases in expenditures for drug enforcement lead to a reduction in the enforcement of nondrug crimes, particularly property crimes, and may
even raise crime rates in those areas.1 3 And, of course, money

9 Id at 8.
10 Id.

11 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration
in African American Communities, 56 Stan L Rev 1271 (2004) (discussing the harmful
effects of mass incarceration on communities with a focus on the mass incarceration of
drug offenders). See also, for example, Robert W. Sweet, Will Money Talk?: The Case for a
Comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis of the War on Drugs, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev 229, 23233 (2009) (discussing collateral costs to the criminalization of drug use).
12 See, for example, Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition:An Unnatural Disaster, 27
Conn L Rev 571, 579 (1995) ("Repeal of drug prohibition would in effect add 400,000 police officers [to enforce other criminal laws]-at no cost.").
13 See Bruce L. Benson, Escalatingthe War on Drugs: Causes and Unintended Consequences, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev 293, 330-49 (2009) (providing an overview of the empirical literature in this area and concluding that "[s]upport for the hypothesis that drug
enforcement causes property crime is robust across these studies"). See also Darren Urada, et al, Evaluationof Proposition36: The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of
2000: 2008 Report 213 n 6 (UCLA Integrated Substance Abuse Programs 2008), online at
http/www.adp.ca.gov/SACPA/PDF/2008_Final Report.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (reporting in reference to a drop in violent crime following a California drug treatment initiative
that "[o]ne untested hypothesis is that as Prop 36 has removed drug offenders from overcrowded jails and prisons, space has been created to incarcerate more offenders sentenced
for more-serious [crimes] than would be possible in the absence of Prop 36, creating a
larger drop in violent crime than would have been possible in the absence of Prop 36").
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spent on drug enforcement is also unavailable for non-lawenforcement uses, like education. 14
Yet, for all of the money we spend, there is little evidence
that our current drug strategy has significantly affected drug use
rates or availability. Nearly half of high school seniors have used
an illegal drug by the time they graduate,1 5 more kids say it is
easier for them to buy marijuana than alcohol, 16 and a 2008
World Health Organization (WHO) study of seventeen countries
found that the United States had the highest rates of illegal drug
use. 17 Indeed, the WHO study found that the percentage of people who have used marijuana in America is more than double
that in the Netherlands, where marijuana is openly bought and
sold in coffee shops.' 8 And, while drug prohibition undoubtedly
increases the price of illegal drugs to users, our policies have not
had much success even in that area. A 2008 report from The
Brookings Institution, for example, found that "the street prices
of cocaine and heroin fell steadily and dramatically" between
1980 and 2007.19
The Brookings report concluded that demand reduction is
the only long-term solution to the problem of drug abuse. It recommended, among other things, that the United States government undertake a comprehensive reevaluation of its drug policies. Nevertheless, there continues to be a very troubling gap
between the availability of drug addiction treatment and the
14 See, for example, The Pew Center on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in
America 14-16 (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2008), online at http/www.pewcenter
onthestates.org/uploadedFilesi8015PCTSPrison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf
(visited
Oct 3, 2010) (discussing how corrections spending crowds out spending on other priorities
such as education).
15 Lloyd D. Johnson, et al, Monitoring the Future: National Survey Results on Drug
Use 1975-2007, NIH Pub No 08-6418A 102 Table 4-1a (National Institute on Drug Abuse
Sept 2008), online at http//www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/voll_2007.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010).
16 National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University,
National Survey of American Attitudes on Substance Abuse XIII: Teens and Parents 17
Figure 3.P (Columbia Aug 2008), online at http;//www.casacolumbia.orWarticlefiles/3802008%2OTeen%20Survey%/20Report.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (showing 23 percent of teens
say marijuana is the easiest drug for them to buy while only 15 percent say beer is).
17 Louisa Degenhardt, et al, Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis,
and Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLoS Med
e141 1053, 1057 Table 2 (2008) ("WHO Survey"), online at http//medicine.plosjournals.
org/archive/1549-1676/5/7/pdf/10.1371journal.pmed.0050141-L.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
1s See id.
19 Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a
Turbulent World 25-26 (The Brookings Institution 2008), online at http/www.brookings.
edu/reports/2008/1124_latinamerica-partnership.aspx (visited Oct 3, 2010) (observing
that "[tioday, the street price of cocaine is a quarter of what it was in 1981").
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number of individuals who need it. The Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration has estimated, for example, that in 2007 only 17.8 percent of persons who needed drug
treatment received it, a number that has remained largely un20
changed throughout the decade.
In sum, drug enforcement measures have been a chief contributor to dramatic increases in state and local corrections and
law enforcement budgets over the past thirty years. But despite
pouring more and more money into the effort, we haven't had
much success in combating the problem of drug abuse.
Given these two dynamics, it is not surprising that as state
and local governments look to trim their budgets in the midst of
the current recession, drug enforcement has attracted a great
deal of attention as an area where they may be able to reduce
corrections and law enforcement spending without compromising
(and perhaps even improving) public safety. This trend has led to
a range of reform proposals. A handful of states have even begun
to seriously explore the idea of taxing and regulating marijuana
like alcohol. In California, for example, State Assemblyman Tom
Ammiano introduced a marijuana legalization bill, citing economic considerations in the form of revenue and savings as his
chief motivations. 2 1 Spurred by the momentum of Ammiano's
proposal, reform advocates in California gathered signatures to
place the issue on the November 2010 ballot. 22 As Robert Mikos
argues in his contribution to this Symposium, there may be
cause for skepticism that legalizing marijuana would generate
23
significant revenue for states, at least in the short term.
Despite public opinion polling that shows support for taxing
and regulating marijuana approaching the 50 percent mark, the
24
idea is still viewed in most states as politically controversial.
One cost-cutting drug policy reform idea that does appear to
have gained a broad consensus among both politicians and policy
20 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, DHHS Publication
No SMA 08-4343: Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings 83 (Department of Health and Human Services Sept 2008), online at
http//www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsdub/2k7nsdub/2k7Results.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
21 See Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuanaand Other Federal Crimes, 2010
U Chi Legal F 223 (discussing this phenomenon and arguing that taxing and regulating
marijuana may not be the budget panacea many proponents claim it would be).
22 Jesse McKinley, Latest Legal-MarijuanaPush is All About the Tax Revenue, NY
Times Al (Mar 26, 2010).
23 Mikos, 2010 U Chi Legal F 223 (cited in note 21).
24 See, for example, Karl Vick, Support for Legalizing Marijuana Grows Rapidly
Around the US: Approval for Medical Use Expands Alongside Criticism of Prohibition,
Wash Post A7 (Nov 23, 2009).
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analysts, however, is shifting resources away from incarceration
and toward treatment when it comes to low-level and nonviolent
drug offenders. 25 The overwhelming weight of studies in this area
indicates that shifting drug-control resources toward treatment
would not only save money but would quite likely achieve better
results than our current approach. An analysis by the RAND
Corporation, for example, found that each cocaine-control dollar
used for treatment generates societal cost savings of $7.48, compared to savings of only 52 cents for every dollar used for domes26
tic law enforcement.

II. THE POSSIBILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS, OF
CRIMINAL DRUG COURTS
There are, of course, many different ways that a state might
shift its drug policy spending away from corrections and law enforcement and toward treatment. 27 When it comes to cost-saving
approaches for dealing with drug users specifically, however,
criminal drug courts are rapidly emerging as a popular alternative to incarceration. A recent survey by the National Center for
State Courts reported that "[e]xpanding the use of drug courts
... [was] among the leading current sentencing reform efforts in
the states."28 This trend is only likely to grow stronger as
President Obama has made expanding funding for state and local drug courts a cornerstone of his drug-control strategy. Already, the administration has upped funding for the federal drug
courts grant program by 250 percent, a number that seems quite
29
likely to increase next year as well.

25 See Sweet, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev at 238-39 (cited in note 11) (discussing recent
interest among lawmakers in treatment-based alternatives to incarceration for drug
offenders); White House Tries to Combat Drug Demand with Rehab, CNN.com (Apr 18,
2009), online at http/articles.cnn.coniV2009-04-18/politics/obama.drug.war-l_drug-courtdrug-czar-drug-control?_s=PM:POLITICS (visited Oct 3, 2010).
26 C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus
Demand Programs42 (RAND 1994). See also Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King, A 25-Year
Quagmire: The War on Drugs and Its Impact on American Society 17-18 (The Sentencing
at
http/www.sentencingproject.org/doe/publications/dp2007),
online
Project
25yearquagmire.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (discussing studies that drug treatment is more
cost-effective at controlling drug abuse and crime than incarceration).
27 See, for example, Mark A.R. Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less
Crime and Less Punishment 149-63 (Princeton 2009) (providing an overview of various
cost-effective alternatives to current drug policies).
28 Roger K. Warren, A Tale of Two Surveys: Judicialand Public Perspectives on State
Sentencing Reform, 21 Fed Sent Rep 276, 277 (2009).
29 White House Tries to Combat DrugDemand, CNN.com (cited in note 25).
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With such rapidly growing support, it would not be a stretch
to envision a future in which drug courts become the customary
model for processing low-level drug offenders in the criminal justice system. Yet, while criminal drug courts certainly offer many
advantages over the current system, they also suffer from a
number of inefficiencies and problems of their own. In this Part,
I will provide an overview of the criminal drug court model and
its benefits, along with a detailed look at some of its shortcomings.
A.

An Overview of Drug Courts

Fifteen years ago, the subject of The University of Chicago
Legal Forum's annual symposium was "Toward a Rational Drug
Policy." Two of the participants at that event cited drug courts as
an emerging and promising treatment-oriented alternative to jail
sentences for drug addicts. 30 At the time, the concept of drug
courts was still in its infancy. The first modern drug court had
opened its doors just five years earlier in Miami, Florida, and the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals was formed in
the same year as the Legal Forum Symposium. 31 Today, we have
over two thousand drug courts in the United States, 32 a number
that, as noted above, is likely to increase in the coming years
along with the expanding budget.
Drug courts vary widely in the details of their operations,
but in essence they allow some drug offenders to obtain treatment under the close supervision of a drug court in place of a
traditional sentence. Drug courts are designed to be nonadversarial, with the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge working
30 Mathea Falco, Toward a More Effective Drug Policy, 1994 U Chi Legal F 9, 18
("Some cities, such as Miami, have created special drug courts to provide immediate
treatment for drug offenders. These programs have shown good results, with a treatment
cost per offender of less than $1,000."); Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The
Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug Crisis, 1994 U Chi Legal F 83, 103
(arguing in favor of "providing treatment in prisons and creating drug courts, similar to
the system used by Janet Reno in Florida, where successful completion of a courtsanctioned drug treatment program allows those caught with small amounts of drugs to
avoid prison or jail time").
31 See Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins
and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 Am Crim L Rev 1513, 1517-25 (2003) (discussing the history of drug courts); Michael C. Dorf and Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem
Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization,40 Am Crim L Rev 1501, 150203 (2003) (describing the emergence of drug courts).
32 America's Problem-Solving Courts: The Criminal Costs of Treatment and the Case
for Reform 16 (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 2009) (-NACDL Report"), online at http;//wwwl.spa.american.edurjustice/documents/2710.pdf (visited Oct 3,
2010).
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together for the goal of promoting public safety. Drug court judges typically monitor and evaluate defendants through regular
status hearings, frequent drug and alcohol testing, and other
methods. If a drug court participant fails to comply with program
requirements-by, for example, testing positive for drugs-the
judge may impose sanctions. These sanctions are generally imposed on a graduated basis and can range from the imposition of
work detail or community service to brief jail sentences to termination from the program. 33 Judges can likewise reward participants who are on track with intermediate benefits, such as com34
plimentary public transportation passes.
In 1997, the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals, in partnership with the U.S. Department of
Justice, formalized this basic structure by publishing a report
with "ten key components" for drug courts and requiring state
and local drug courts to abide by them in order to be eligible for
federal funding. 35 Beyond these ten components, however, there
is a wide diversity in the operation of drug courts. 36 In terms of
procedural posture drug courts can be grouped into three
basic models: (1) pre-plea/pre-adjudication, (2) post-plea/preadjudication, and (3) post-adjudication.3 7 In the first category,
prosecution is deferred while the defendant goes through the
drug court process.38 A defendant will typically be required to
waive certain procedural rights (such as the right to a speedy
trial), but will retain her right to challenge the charge against
her should she fail to complete the program and be returned to a
traditional court. 39 In the "post-plea/pre-adjudication" scenario, a
guilty plea is part of the price of admission into the drug court,
but the plea is held in abeyance during the defendant's participation in the program. 40 If the defendant succeeds in the drug
court, the charge will be dismissed, but if she fails, the plea is
33 See NACDL Report at 17-18 (cited in note 32) (discussing the use and types of
sanctions imposed in drug courts).
34 See id.

35 National Institute of Justice, National CriminalJustice Reference Service Publication No NCJ 211081: NIJ Special Report: Drug Courts: The Second Decade 3 (NCJRS
2006), online at http//www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/211081.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (summarizing the "10 key components").
36 See NACDL Report at 17 (cited in note 32); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction:
Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 Ohio St L J 1479,
1489-91 (2004).
37 NACDL Report at 17 (cited in note 32).
38 See id.

39 See id; Miller, 65 Ohio State L J at 1489 (cited in note 36).
40 See NACDL Report at 17 (cited in note 32).
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entered and a sentence is imposed. 4 1 Finally, in the post42
adjudication model, a defendant pleads guilty and is convicted.
The sentence is then suspended pending the successful completion of the drug court program. 43 Some post-adjudication programs provide a method for a successful defendant to have her
record expunged. 44 In others, however, a successful defendant
will escape imposition of the suspended sentence but will still
45
have a conviction on her record.
Eligibility requirements also vary significantly from court to
court, though typically a defendant who wishes to gain entry into
a drug court program must be charged with drug possession or
another nonviolent offense and must demonstrate that she has a
46
substance abuse problem.
For all their differences, perhaps the most important quality
that unites American drug courts is that they are uniformly a
part of the criminal system. Drug possession remains criminalized and those caught with drugs are arrested and processed by
the police as usual. Drug court programs only enter the picture
at this stage, offering a way out for individuals who are facing a
prison sentence or who would simply prefer not to have a criminal record. In every instance-whether pre-plea or postadjudication-the threat of a criminal sanction hangs over the
treatment process, and judges are responsible for meting out
graduated sanctions. As a result, within the drug court system,
"[t]he court, rather than treatment center, becomes the focal
point of the treatment process." 47 Similarly, though drug courts
operate on the premise that drug addiction is a disease that
should be treated and not punished, criminal sanctions ultimately await those who fail the program and those who either choose
48
not to participate or are excluded from participating.

41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 See NACDL Report at 17-18 (cited in note 32).
45 Id.
46 Ryan S. King and Jill Pasquarella, Drug Courts:A Review of the Evidence 3-4 (The
at http//www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dponline
2009),
Project
Sentencing
drugcourts.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (summarizing drug court eligibility criteria).
47 Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev 417, 423
(2009).
48 See Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 NC L Rev 1437, 1474-75
(2000) (discussing the conflicted dual role of drug courts as both a cure for a disease and a
solution for a crime).
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Why Drug Courts Are (Almost Certainly) Better than the
Status Quo

Drug courts appear to have been born primarily out of necessity. As drug war arrests and prosecutions reached a crescendo in the late 1980s, many urban court and prison systems were
having a hard time keeping pace. Drug courts were conceived as
a method for helping to control rapidly increasing court caseloads
and prison populations. 49 But as the courts spread during the
early 1990s, drug court advocates began to look beyond the immediate benefits in managing caseloads and jail populations and
focused their attention on drugs courts as a potentially more effective and therapeutic alternative to the status quo. 5°
Today, most drug court advocates view them as both a less
expensive method for processing low-level drug offenders
through the criminal justice system and a more humane and effective approach to addressing the problem of substance abuse
than conventional options. Whatever faults that drug courts may
have, there does appear to be a fairly broad consensus for the
proposition that drug courts produce better results than incarceration and at a reduced cost. 51 Various studies have found that
drug courts reduce criminal justice and victimization costs as
compared to incarceration or even simple probation, and others
have found long-term savings have been achieved in counties
where drug court programs have been instituted. 52 An analysis
in California, for example, found that the drug courts studied
49 See McCoy, 40 Am Crim L Rev at 1520 (cited in note 31) ("In 1989-1992, all of the
articles [about drug courts] concerned the crushing court caseload caused by the War on
Drugs and management approaches for addressing it.").
50 See id at 1521 ("At this point, the intellectual agenda 'turned,' as historians and
literary scholars say. Therapeutic rhetoric was overtaking management rationales for
court reform.").
51 See Kleiman, Brute Force at 161-62 (cited in note 27) (stating that "[a]s a means of
incapacitation, drug treatment is by far more cost-effective than incarceration" and noting that "[w]hile outcome evaluations have been mixed, there seems little doubt that
some drug courts are performing quite well and saving money"); Avinash Singh Bhati,
John K. Roman, and Aaron Chalfim, To Treat or Not to Treat: Evidence on the Prospect of
Expanding Treatment to Drug-Involved Offenders 52-58 (The Urban Institute 2008),
online at http/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411645_treatment-offenders.pdf (visited
Oct 3, 2010) (examining the cost-effectiveness of treating currently eligible drug court
participants). But see Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand L Rev
783, 827-28 (2004) (reviewing the argument that drug courts might actually increase
incarceration rates through a "net-widening" effect that leads police to make arrests, and
prosecutors to file charges, in low-level cases that they would not have pursued previously).

52 King and Pasquarella, Drug Courts at 5-9 (cited in note 46) (providing an overview
of key studies).
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cost only $3,000 on average per client while generating an average savings of $11,000 per client in reductions in recidivism and
costs to victims. 53 A systemic review of drug court research by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2005 found that
the studies showed net benefits ranging from $1,000 to $15,000
per drug court participant. 5 4 As the 2009 National Drug Control
Strategy put it when summarizing the research into the efficacy
of drug courts, "Over a decade of drug court research shows that
"5
[drug] courts work better than jail or prison. 5
My aim here, however, is not to evaluate or question the
premise that drug courts are, in general, a cost-effective and
more humane alternative to incarceration. Indeed, I have previously argued elsewhere that federal funding for drug courts
should be expanded. 56 My goal in this paper is to consider how
criminal drug courts might fare in comparison to an alternative
civil drug court system. Accordingly, taking it as a given that the
weight of authority shows drug courts to be more effective than
conventional punishment, I will keep my discussion of studies
about the merits of criminal drug courts to a minimum and turn
now to the task of drawing out their shortcomings.
C.

Drug Court Inefficiencies

For all of the praise heaped upon drug courts, they are not
without their critics. Just last year, as the Obama administration embraced the expansion of drug court funding as a key component of its drug control strategy, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) issued a high-profile and
highly critical assessment of the current drug court model.5 7 The
NACDL report highlighted a number of areas for concern, with a
53 See Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: 2008
Annual Report 29, online at http//www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ondcp/221371.pdf (visited Oct
3, 2010).
5' Government Accountability Office, Adult Drug Courts: Evidence Indicates Recidivism Reductions and Mixed Results for Other Outcomes 71 (GAO 2005), online at
httpV/www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
55 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: 2009
Annual Report 20, online at httpV/www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs09/2009ndcs.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
56 Kreit, 3 Advance: J ACS Issue Groups at 49 (cited in note 6).
57 See generally NACDL Report (cited in note 32). See also Douglas A. Berman,
Important New NACDL Report Critical of Modern Drug Court Movement (Sentencing
Law and Policy Blog Sept 29, 2009), online at http//sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing-law-and_policy/ 2009/09/important-new-nacdl-report-that-is-critical-of-drugcourt-movement.html (visited Oct 3, 2010) (discussing the NACDL report in comparison
to the Obama Administration's embrace of drug courts).
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particular emphasis on the problems attendant to "post-plea" or
post-adjudication drug courts, which require a defendant to enter
a guilty plea to access treatment, as well as problems that arise
"from the fundamental tension between the defense lawyer's traditional role as a zealous advocate for clients and the drug court's
...

nonadversarial, collaborative approach."5 8 The NACDL's re-

port also took issue with drug court admissions criteria, noting
that many drug courts currently have no official criteria at all
and give prosecutors nearly complete discretion to determine
which defendants get into the system and which do not. 59 And, in
a criticism that is related to the lack of objective admissions criteria in many drug courts, there has been a growing concern that
the severe racial disparities seen in general drug enforcement
are exacerbated in the drug court system. 60 Though research in
this area has been limited, the available evidence indicates that
a disproportionate percentage of drug offenders who gain admittance into drug courts are white and that, even among drug court
participants, drug court sanctions are disproportionately visited
upon people of color and the indigent. 61 While racial disparity,
admissions criteria, and the ethical obligations of defense attorneys are all important issues facing drug courts, this section will
look specifically at how drug courts, while more cost effective
than traditional measures, still fall short from a cost-benefit
standpoint.
As discussed above, there is a great deal of evidence that
when it comes to dealing with low-level drug offenders, drug
courts are less expensive and far more effective than incarceration. And yet, drug courts that operate within the criminal system are still a very cumbersome way to address the underlying
concerns in this area: drug demand, drug abuse, and drug addiction. First, drug courts are overinclusive because they cause individuals who do not have drug abuse or addiction problems and
5S See NACDL Report at 29-30 (quotation omitted) (cited in note 32).
59 See id at 22-23.
60 See id at 23, 42-45 ("The eligibility criteria and the blanket prohibitions have
contributed to serious concerns about racial and socio-economic class discrimination in
admission policies.").
61 See id; Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a
Response to Racial Injustice, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev 463, 477 (2009) ("[M]uch evidence now
suggests that white drug offenders are more likely to benefit from this 'pathway out' than
black drug offenders. This means that [drug treatment courts] are apt to exacerbate, not
ameliorate, overall racial disparities."); Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving
Courts, 21 Nat] Black L J 27, 40-42 (2009) (discussing issues of race and drug courts). For
a review of racial disparity and drug enforcement generally, see Doris Marie Provine,
Unequal Under Law: Race in the War on Drugs (Chicago 2007).
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are not in need of drug treatment to use precious treatment resources in order to avoid the consequences of a conviction. Second, drug courts are also underinclusive. Many defendants who
qualify for drug court programs and need treatment may nevertheless decide not to participate in a drug court program because
the consequences of a conviction are not severe enough to make
entering into the program worthwhile.
1. Treatment, whether or not you need it.
The criminal prohibition of the possession and distribution
of small quantities of controlled substances turns all drug users
into criminals, whether or not they are addicted, violent, or otherwise law abiding. A substantial percentage of drug users, however, do not have a drug abuse problem and will never develop
one. Indeed, the available evidence shows that most people who
62
use an illegal drug will stop using entirely within five years.
Many more will continue to use drugs regularly or sporadically
without any negative impact on their lives. And, even among users who do go on to abuse drugs (including alcohol), many will
simply outgrow the problem without treatment.6 3 Of course,
someone who is arrested for drug possession or sale is more likely than the average user to suffer from an abuse or addiction
problem. A person who has an addiction or abuse problem may
be more likely to engage in risky behavior that would lead them
to encounter the police and be arrested for drug possession. And
a drug abuser is more likely to be in possession of a controlled
substance at any given time than a casual user simply because
someone who abuses or is addicted to drugs will use and carry
them more frequently. Nevertheless, in any system that criminalizes the possession, cultivation, and distribution of small
quantities of controlled substances, a substantial percentage of
those who are arrested and prosecuted will inevitably be nonaddicts and nonabusers.
For these reasons, drug courts that operate within the criminal justice system run into the problem of overinclusiveness and
62 Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other
Vices, Times, and Places 16 (Cambridge 2001).
63 See, for example, Stanton Peele, Addiction Proof Your Child: A Realistic Approach
to PreventingDrug, Alcohol, and Other Dependencies 3 (Three Rivers 2007) ("[Aldolescent
drug use rarely leads to addiction. And addiction itself does not leave people powerless.
Most people outgrow substance abuse-even serious addictions."); Jacob Sullum, Saying
Yes: In Defense of Drug Use 7-29 (Tarcher/Putnam 2003) (discussing drug use in contemporary American culture).

2991

THE DECRIMINALIZATION OPTION

313

run the risk of funneling nonaddicts into treatment that they
don't need.6 4 Not surprisingly, then, drug courts often require
would-be participants to have either tested positive for drugs or
to demonstrate that they suffer from an abuse problem in order
to gain entry. 65 These requirements are undermined, however, by
the relative ease with which an individual can fake an abuse or
addiction problem and by incentives that tend to result in the
admission of nonaddicts into drug court programs.
Nonaddicted defendants will often have a very strong motivation to embellish the extent of their use in order to prove that
they have an abuse problem and become eligible to participate in
a drug court. This is because, for an individual without addiction
or abuse problems, a drug court will often be a far more preferable alternative to a drug conviction. Even if the punishment a
person is facing is relatively minimal, an otherwise law-abiding
recreational drug user will generally have an especially strong
interest in avoiding a drug conviction. A drug conviction carries
with it a wide array of collateral legal consequences (in addition
to the social stigma associated with a criminal conviction), including the loss of a range of federal benefits and professional
licenses.6 6 A nonaddict, who may be a student or have a regular
job, is likely to be more concerned with these types of consequences than someone who is suffering from an abuse or addiction problem and living on the margins of society. At the same
time, participating in a drug court program is a low-risk endeavor for a nonaddict because he will not have much difficulty passing drug tests and adhering to other program requirements. As
one commentator put it: "Defendants understand that they have
64 See Miller, 65 Ohio St L J at 1551-53 (cited in note 36) (arguing that because the
drug court process is "facilitated by the competing classificatory goals of treatment providers and criminal justice professionals ... a system initially targeted at drug addicts
comes primarily to serve drug users who may or may not be addicted"); David W. Rasmussen and Bruce L. Benson, RationalizingDrug Policy under Federalism,30 Fla St U L
Rev 679, 733 (2003) (arguing that drug courts are "very likely to squander valuable
treatment resources by imposing treatment on casual experimenters who have no discernable drug problem").
65 See King and Pasquarella, Drug Courts at 3 (cited in note 46). For a more detailed
discussion of examples of eligibility criteria for drug courts, see Peggy Fulton Hora,
William G. Schma, and John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to
Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 439, 481-502 (1999).
66 See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the CollateralConsequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J Gender Race & Just 253, 258-62 (2002) ("[U]nder current law
drug offenses are subjected to more and harsher collateral consequences than any other
category of crime."); Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow, 90
Cornell L Rev 1411, 1465-74 (2005) (discussing federal laws denying welfare, public
housing, and financial aid to drug offenders).
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to play the treatment game to pass through the criminal
hoops."6 7 And, because addiction and abuse are imprecise disorders the diagnosis of which will typically depend on an individual's self-reported behavior, 68 it would be difficult to stop a determined defendant from entering a drug court program under false
pretenses even in a system that was firmly dedicated to weeding
out nonaddicts.
At the same time, despite the letter of their eligibility requirements, drug courts generally have a very strong interest in
admitting nonaddicted clients. This is because drug courts rely
on funding that is contingent, implicitly or explicitly, upon
demonstrating results and treating a sufficient number of defendants.6 9 Indeed, a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence
indicates that many drug courts actively seek out "low-risk" nonaddicted clients and do their best to "skim" high-risk clients
70
away from their programs in order to boost their success rate.
Many drug court gatekeepers may also have less self-interested
reasons for admitting nonaddicts. The NACDL report recounted
the testimony of a drug court judge who "favors opening the door
'as wide as we can' because 'treatment court is the best game in
town.'"

71

In a recent illuminating and insightful article, Josh Bowers
explains how these dynamics play out in New York City drug
courts to create what he deems a "dealers court," in which nonaddicted drug dealers are the primary beneficiaries of the pro-

67 Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and
Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29
Fordham Urban L J 2063, 2069 n 25 (2003). See also, for example, NACDL Report at 73 n
484 (cited in note 32) (reporting the testimony of a public defender who said "I've had
clients that really were at the wrong place, wrong time, got busted for possession, and
they weren't drug addicts, yet they have to go through the entire system, urine, go to
meetings, and it's unfortunate the way it is").
68 See Stephen J. Morse, Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 L & Phil
3, 8 (2000) (observing that "there is no consensus definition [of addiction] and any definition chosen will be problematic").
69 Josh Bowers, ContraindicatedDrugCourts, 55 UCLA L Rev 783, 800 & n 69 (2008)
(noting that drug courts are funding-dependent entities, and the money streams hinge on
meeting capacity and treatment targets).
70 Id; NACDL Report at 22-23 (cited in note 32).
71 NACDL Report at 49 (cited in note 32). See, for example, id at 73 n 484 (reporting
the testimony of a public defender who observed that "Nobody has ever done that interview and said, 'You don't need our services. Go and be well.' Everybody's got a problem");
Miller, 65 Ohio St L J at 1553 (cited in note 36) ("Treatment programs, in an effort to
demonstrate effectiveness, start cherry picking the low-risk candidates who would have
been screened out of a traditional diversion system and channeling up and into the criminal justice system the high-risk candidates they were originally designed to serve.").
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gram. 72 Relying on two empirical studies of New York City drug
courts as well as his own experiences as a Bronx County public
defender, Bowers reports that prosecutors would skim high-risk
defendants from the system while doing "almost nothing to ensure that treatment offers went to the addicted."73 The prosecutors would begin their assessment of potential drug court cases
by reviewing the file for "'paper eligibility'-a nonclinical paperbased assessment that would turn entirely on the defendant's
current charges and past record, not on his therapeutic need or
lack thereof."74 Prosecutors would make their offers on the paperbased assessment alone. At that point, defendants would undergo a clinical assessment. But, Bowers reports, "only a small fraction of candidates were rejected for insufficient addiction or
use."75 As a result, Bowers observes that a substantial percentage of New York City drug court participants are actually non76
addicted drug dealers.
Few studies have attempted to quantify the prevalence of
drug court participants who do not have addiction or abuse problems within drug court programs. Drug court studies that have
attempted to assess rates of drug dependency among participants, however, indicate that a substantial number of drug court
clients do not have a substance use disorder. One team of researchers that has measured drug dependency in drug court
found that "nearly one half of misdemeanor drug court clients,
one third of felony drug court clients, and two thirds of pretrial
clients in a drug treatment and monitoring program produced
'sub-threshold' drug composite scores on the Addiction Severity
77
Index."
An examination of past-month use rates of individuals entering treatment from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health's
Treatment Episode Data Set suggests that the findings in the
handful of individual studies to address the issue are not anoma72 Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 794-97 (cited in note 69).
73 Id at 798.
74 Id.

75 Id at 799.
76 See Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 790-803 (cited in note 69). See also Timothy
Edwards, The Theory and Practiceof Compulsory Drug Treatment in the CriminalJustice
System: the Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 Wisc L Rev 283, 334 ("[The criminal justice
system casts a wide net in an attempt to provide treatment to drug users who would not
qualify as 'addicts' under traditional clinical classification schemes.").
77 David S. DeMatteo, B. Marlowe Douglas, and David S. Festinger, Secondary Prevention Services for Clients Who Are Low Risk in Drug Court: A Conceptual Model, 52
Crime & Delinq 114, 115 (2006) (citations omitted).
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lous. 78 The data set includes the frequency of a treatment client's
drug use prior to entering treatment for his or her primary drug
substance of abuse, as well as the person or entity responsible for
referring the client to the program. Looking at the frequency of
use by referral type from the most recent available year (2007)
reveals that an unusually large number of individuals referred to
treatment by the criminal justice system had used their primary
substance of supposed abuse either not at all or only rarely within the month before entering treatment. 79 Specifically, 38 percent
of individuals who entered treatment because of a referral from a
state or federal court80 had not used drugs at all within the past
month.8 1 Another 17 percent had only used their primary substance of abuse one to three times in the one month prior to entering treatment.8 2 That means 55 percent of all individuals who
were referred to treatment by a court program had used their
primary drug of abuse less than three times in the month before
they entered into treatment.8 3 By comparison, only 21 percent of
individuals who referred themselves to treatment had used their
primary drug of abuse less than three times in the past month.
The charts below provide a more detailed picture.8 4 In reading
the charts, it is worth paying particular attention to the striking
difference between use rates among drug court referrals and use
rates among all other categories of referrals.

78 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Treatment Episode
at httpi/dx.doi.org/10.3886/
Data Set-Admissions (2007) ("TEDS-A'), online
ICPSR24280 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
79 See id.
80 Unfortunately, the referral data does not separate drug courts from other court
referrals. However, DUI and DWI referrals are excluded from this figure, making it likely
that a very large percentage of the referrals in this category come from drug courts.
81 TEDS-A (cited in note 78).
82 Id.
83 See id.

84 These charts were compiled from statistics in TEDS-A (cited in note 78).
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Figure 1. Frequency of use (primary)by detailed criminal justice
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Figure 2. Frequency of use (primary) by principal source of
referral
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Interestingly, when we look at the numbers for a particularly addictive substance, such as heroin, the difference between
criminal justice referrals and others is even more striking.
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Figure 3. Frequency of use by principal source of referral for
clients with heroin as their primary substance of abuse
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These statistics are, of course, inherently limited in their
ability to tell us the total number of drug court participants who
do not have a genuine abuse or addiction problem. It is certainly
possible, for example, for a person to suffer from a substance
abuse or addiction problem without having used (or having used
only infrequently) within the month prior to their admission into
treatment. Similarly, some criminal justice treatment clients
might be motivated to conceal their use or to scale back their use
before entering treatment in order to demonstrate their compliance to the court. While these statistics cannot tell us the scope
of the overinclusiveness problem with specificity, however, the
abnormally large number of criminal justice treatment clients
who had used three times or fewer prior to entering treatment
seems to provide strong corroboration for the general proposition
that a not-insubstantial number of drug court participants do not
have a substance abuse or addiction problem.8 5 Rather, these
individuals are gaming the system and entering treatment not
because they have any need for it but because it is a preferable
alternative to the punishment they would otherwise receive.
It is self-evident, of course, that sending an individual who
does not have a drug abuse or addiction problem to receive drug
treatment is not an efficient use of scarce and costly drug treatment resources. Processing nonaddicts through the machinery of
drug courts-including regular drug testing, drug court appearances, and other requirements-is also unlikely to provide significant benefits in return for the investment. Indeed, participation
in drug court programs may be counterproductive for nonaddicted defendants since meeting program requirements are likely to
interfere with their work and family responsibilities.8 6 Because
drug courts generally attempt to tailor their treatment regimens
to the participant, it is worth noting that low-risk offenders
without abuse problems may cost drug courts less than the average drug court participant. And drug courts are still less expensive than incarceration. This fact, however, is precisely why
there is unlikely to be a solution to the overinclusiveness prob85 See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Substance
Abuse Treatment Admissions Referred by the Criminal Justice System (SAMHSA Aug
2009), online at http;//www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k9/211/211CJadmits2k9. pdf (visited Oct 3,
2010) (analyzing trends and reporting that criminal justice referral admissions are nearly
twice as likely as all others to be employed full or part time and that the fastest growth in
criminal justice referrals has included admissions for marijuana).
86 See DeMatteo, Marlowe, and Festinger, 52 Crime & Delinq at 118 (cited in note 77)
(arguing that program "requirements may compete with clients' legitimate responsibilities, such as work, which puts them in a tough spot").
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lem within criminal drug courts. As long as treatment or typical
criminal justice solutions like incarceration are the only options,
drug courts will be seen as the most cost-effective option for lowrisk defendants, even those who do not have substance abuse
problems.
2.

Why drug courts fail to treat many defendants in need.

While criminal drug courts can lead government to direct
treatment resources to those who do not need them, they can also
be an inefficient method for ensuring that those who truly do
need treatment receive it. Drug courts suffer from two key shortcomings that cause them to be underinclusive.
The most prominent underinclusiveness critique of drug
courts is that many drug court programs exclude a wide range of
offenders with substance abuse problems, either automatically or
at the discretion of the prosecutor.8 7 For example, individuals
who have a prior conviction for a violent offense and those who
have a history of failed treatment are frequently barred from
drug courts.8 8 A 2008 study by the Urban Institute estimated
that allowing individuals with a crime of prior violence to participate in drug courts nationwide would yield a total of $4.3 billion
in benefits at a cost of $2 billion. 9 Further, removing all of the
common barriers to entry into drug courts would produce a net
benefit of $32 billion. 90
There is, on the other hand, evidence suggesting that at
least some percentage of individuals who are currently excluded
from drug courts may be sufficiently likely to commit serious
nondrug crimes that allowing them into a diversion program
would not be worth the cost. Statistics from California's drug
treatment diversion program "Proposition 36," for example, have
shown that individuals who had five or more nondrug arrests
within the thirty months prior to treatment were significantly
more likely to commit serious nondrug crimes during their participation in the diversion program.9 1 Accordingly, excluding that
87 See Bhati, Roman, and Chalfin, To Treat or Not to Treat, at 26-34 (cited in note
51) (discussing drug court eligibility in general); NACDL Record at 22-23 (cited in note
32) (discussing eligibility criteria in general).
88 See Hoffman, 78 NC L Rev at 1462 (cited in note 48). See, for example, Bhati,
Roman, and Chalfm, To Treat or Not to Treat at 60-62 (cited in note 51) (discussing the
past-violence exclusion in drug court eligibility).
89 Bhati, Roman, and Chalfin, To Treat or Not to Treat at 60-62 (cited in note 51).
90 Id at 66.
91 Kleiman, Brute Force at 162 (cited in note 27) (noting that while only 1.6 percent of
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limited subset of individuals from treatment programs and incapacitating them through incarceration may be cost beneficial.
Wherever the line is ultimately drawn, however, there does appear to be persuasive evidence that dropping many of current
92
drug court restrictions would provide substantial cost savings.
The eligibility problem, however, is not a problem that is inherent to criminal drug courts. Indeed, to the extent eligibility
restrictions are a problem, they could easily be addressed within
the current criminal drug court system simply by doing away
with the inefficient restrictions. So, while easing eligibility restrictions may provide cost benefits, the fact that most drug
courts incorporate eligibility restrictions does not weigh against
keeping drug courts within the criminal system.
A trickier underinclusiveness problem for criminal drug
courts relates to defendants who are eligible for drug court programs but who choose not to participate in them or are never
given the offer because their offense is not serious enough. Very
often, defendants who are eligible to participate in drug court
programs would be likely to receive probation or a relatively light
prison sentence in a traditional criminal court. 93 For these defendants, the burdens and risks of participating in a drug court
may not be worth the potential rewards.
Ironically, defendants who have the greatest treatment need
are the most likely to be counseled by their attorneys not to participate in a drug court program. This is because, according to a
growing body of evidence, defendants who participate in a drug
court program but fail to complete it often receive longer sentences (sometimes quite longer) than similarly situated defendants who are conventionally adjudicated. 94 A study of New York
City drug courts found, for example, that failing participants
generally received sentences two to five times as long as conventional defendants. 95 Needless to say, defendants with the most
severe addiction problems are the most likely to fail treatment.
As a result, defendants who have the greatest treatment need
Prop 36's treatment clients fell into the category of individuals with five nondrug arrests
in thirty months, incarcerating those clients alone would have eliminated more than one
quarter of the total crimes committed by treatment clients).
92 See generally, Bhati, Roman, and Chalfin, To Treat or Not to Treat (cited in note
51).
93 See OTlear, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev at 479 (cited in note 61).
9' See NACDL Report at 29 (cited in note 32) (discussing increased sentences for drug
court participants who fail); Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 792 & n 30 (cited in note 69)
(discussing studies and anecdotal evidence to support this proposition).
95 See Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 792 (cited in note 69).
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may ironically have the strongest incentive not to participate in
criminal drug court programs. As the NACDL report on drug
courts explained, in many cases "the best advice is to litigate the
suppression motion to take a guilty plea to time served to avoid a
96
likely drug court failure and a longer sentence."
Even defendants who are confident that they would be able
to complete the treatment process successfully, however, may opt
not to because they view the alternative as less onerous. 97 A firsttime drug possession offender, for example, might prefer probation to the often more time-consuming and intrusive requirements of drug courts. 98 Other low-level offenders may even receive offers for deferred prosecution without any treatment component. Yet many of these individuals may have a drug abuse or
addiction problem or be at risk for developing one. Providing
treatment to those in need or a "brief intervention"99 and assessment to those who do not yet have abuse or addiction problems at the earliest opportunity would be more cost effective
than waiting until the individual has reoffended and is facing a
sufficiently severe punishment to persuade him or her to enter
treatment.
Because criminal drug courts are premised on making defendants choose between a criminal sanction and a punitive
treatment program, there does not appear to be an easy solution
to this underinclusiveness problem. To be sure, eliminating the
practice of increased sentences for those who fail to complete the
drug court program would help to address the problem in part.
But the problem that many first-time offenders may simply not
be facing a severe enough punishment to entice them into a drug
court could seemingly only be addressed within the current system by increasing punishments for first-time offenders. Of
course, because incarcerating drug addicts is more costly and
96 NACDL Report at 31 (cited in note 32). See also Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 786
(cited in note 69) (arguing that "drug courts are 'contraindicated' for genuine addicts").
97 See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 Wash U L Q 1205, 1256 (1998) ("Nevertheless, defendants who progress
through the entire treatment court regime and who upon 'graduation' have their charges
dismissed ultimately may have received 'a more onerous disposition in terms of the
length of time [they are] subject to court control' than they would have received if the
charges had been resolved through standard plea negotiations or trial.").
98 See NACDL Report at 43 (cited in note 32) (discussing the difficulties associated
with following through with drug court while working full-time).
99 For an overview of the screening and brief intervention model, see Pamela Anderson, et al, Screening and Brief Intervention: Making a Public Health Difference, (Join
Together 2008), online at http//www.jointogether.org/aboutus/ourpublications/pdf/sbireport.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
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inefficient than treatment, this option would not appear to be
much of a solution.
III. SHOULD STATES CONSIDER DECRIMINALIZATION?
Even if criminal drug courts may have their shortcomings, it
does not necessarily mean that they are not our best option.
Drug use-along with abuse and addiction-has existed in almost every society in recorded history. There is no silver bullet
that will solve the problem of drug abuse and addiction, and any
system that we design is going to involve trade-offs.
The inefficiencies discussed above, however, seem to be preventable problems that flow primarily from a single source: the
criminalization of drug use and abuse. Because drug courts are
located within the criminal system, they put individuals who are
caught in possession of drugs to a choice between a drug court
treatment program and the (more costly and less effective) traditional criminal penalty. In some cases, this choice will lead defendants who do not have a drug abuse problem and are unlikely
to develop one to obtain treatment they do not need to avoid the
punishment they would otherwise face. In others, defendants
who might benefit from a detailed course of treatment or a brief
medical consultation about their substance use are counseled by
their attorneys not to enter drug court programs because the
punishment they face does not justify the risks or burdens of
drug court. As a result, drug courts can, in some instances, waste
scarce treatment resources on those without drug problems while
allowing others who truly need treatment to pass through the
system without so much as speaking with a treatment or addiction specialist.
That criminal drug courts retain these inefficiencies is not
surprising. Criminal laws against possession of small quantities
of drugs for personal use are not really concerned with possession itself or even with drug use generally.1 0 0 They exist in order
to address the problems of drug abuse and drug addictionproblems that are medical in nature and that only affect a small
100 See Charles H. Whitebread and Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in
Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 Va L Rev 751, 753 (1972) (noting that "possession crimes are somewhat anomalous" because "[p]ossession of an object in and of itself
is not the law's real concern"). But see OTear, 57 Vand L Rev at 804, 790 (cited in note
51) (arguing that drug courts "have a 'treatment-as-punishment' character that makes
them palatable to the legalist mindset" which holds that "people who consume unlawful
substances make a morally wrong decision regardless of whether any tangible harm results").
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percentage of those in possession of drugs. As a result, criminal
laws against possession of small drug quantities are a very imprecise method for addressing the chief problem with which they
are concerned.
All of this leads to the question that I will focus on for the
remainder of this Article: would decriminalization work any better? I will argue that drug decriminalization, implemented in
combination with a civil drug court system, would likely be even
more successful at addressing abuse and addiction than criminal
drug courts, and would do so at a lower cost.
A.

(Re)defining Decriminalization: Lessons from Portugal

Despite all of the debate about drug decriminalization in policy and legal circles, the term remains surprisingly nebulous,
especially in relation to the distinct but associated concept of
drug legalization. 10 1 That said, decriminalizing a drug generally
means removing criminal penalties for its use and possession.102
Manufacture and retail sale of the drug, however, remain prohibited in a decriminalization regime. Legalization, by contrast, refers to a system in which a substance is taxed and regulated like
alcohol or tobacco.
Marijuana has already been decriminalized in a number of
states, most recently Massachusetts, where Bay State voters approved a marijuana decriminalization ballot initiative with 65
percent of the vote. 10 3 These laws typically treat possession of
small amounts of marijuana like a traffic violation, with violators
subject to a citation and a small fine. 10 4 Although decriminalization has not gained much political traction outside of the marijuana context in the United States, the decriminalization of all
drugs is a frequently debated academic topic. Almost all of the
commentary that considers the subject seems to envision laws
101 See Juan R. Torruella, One Judge's Attempt at a Rational Discussion of the So-

Called War on Drugs, 6 BU Pub Int L J 1, 12 (1996) (noting that the terms decriminalization and legalization, "although technically distinct, are often used almost interchangeably').
102 See Douglas Husak, Predictingthe Future: A Bad Reason to CriminalizeDrug Use,
2009 Utah L Rev 105, 105 (describing drug decriminalization).
103 Kreit, 3 Advance: J ACS Issue Groups at 44 (cited in note 6).
114 See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 Vill L Rev 383, 403-05 (1995) (providing an overview of marijuana decriminalization efforts); Robert MacCoun, et al, Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has DecriminalizedMarijuana?Assessing the PerceptualComponent of Deterrence Theory, 5 Rev
L & Econ 347, 351-53 (2009) (listing states that have considered to have decriminalized
marijuana and noting that some of these states have technically retained marijuana
possession as a criminal offense but provided for a small fine as punished).
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similar to our existing marijuana decriminalization laws, with all
civil and criminal penalties for the possession and use of drugs
removed except, perhaps, civil fines. 10 5 Decriminalization, however, is not necessarily limited to options like eliminating all
penalties for drug possession or instituting a civil fine.
10 6
As Portugal's innovative drug decriminalization law
demonstrates, decriminalization can be much different from
what most of us are likely to envision when we hear the phrase.
Portugal's law also provides a useful jumping-off point for considering how a noncriminal drug court treatment system might
compare, in terms of costs and benefits, to the criminal drug
court model currently favored in the United States. Under Portugal's law, passed nearly a decade ago, simple possession of
small amounts of drugs is no longer a crime. And yet, the possession and use of drugs remains subject to close scrutiny by the
Portuguese government.
10 7
A brief overview of Portugal's system is instructive.
Beginning in July of 2001, Portugal implemented a "decriminalization model" for drug users. The law removes criminal penalties
for the purchase, possession, and cultivation of all drugs for personal-use quantities, which the law defines as an amount sufficient for ten days' usage for one person. The sale of drugs in any
quantity, meanwhile, remains illegal in Portugal.
What distinguishes Portugal's approach from the traditional
decriminalization model is what happens to users who are
caught with drugs in personal-use amounts. Rather than receiving no penalty or being given a fine, individuals who are found in
possession of personal-use quantities of drugs are referred into
what we might think of as a civil drug court system. Because
drug possession has been decriminalized, when a police officer in
Portugal encounters a person under the quantity limit, she is not
permitted to make an arrest. Instead, she issues a citation for
the person in possession of drugs to appear before what the law
lO5 See, for example, Mark A.R. Kleiman and Aaron J. Saiger, Drug Legalization: The
Importance of Asking the Right Question, 18 Hofstra L Rev 527, 556-58 (1990) (discussing
issues involved with decriminalization of marijuana).
106 Law No. 30/2000, 276 Diirio da Repiblica 6829 (Nov 29, 2000) online at
http'//www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=200817 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
107 The following description of Portugal's drug decriminalization law draws primarily
from Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal (cited in note 1); Caitlin
Hughes and Alex Stevens, The Effects of Decriminalizationof Drug Use in Portugal (The
Beckley Foundation 2007), online at httpV/www.beckleyfoundation.co.ukpdf/Briefmg
Paperl4.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010); and an interview I conducted with Joko Castel-Branco
Goulko, the director of Portugal's principal drug policy agency, the Instituto da Droga e
da Toxicodepend~ncia, on Aug 3, 2009.
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calls a "dissuasion panel." Typically, a person will appear before
the commission within seventy-two hours of receiving the citation.
Dissuasion panels are organized to be as nonadversarial in
nature as possible. They are made up of three memberstypically two people from the medical or social services fields and
one attorney. The panels meet with the individuals who appear
before them in order to try to assess their treatment needs and to
in addressing any abuse or addiction problems. The
assist them
"offender"1 08 is not represented by counsel when he appears before the commission, though he does have the right to request a
therapist of his choice to take part in the proceedings or to have a
medical examination conducted to aid in the panel's review.
One of the primary objectives of the dissuasion panel structure is to try to foster a supportive atmosphere that is focused
exclusively on the health of the offender. Every effort is made to
guard against creating an impression that the panels are there to
assess guilt or that drug usage is morally blameworthy conduct.
So, for example, the commission members sit at a table with the
offender, as opposed to behind an elevated bench as in a courtroom.
Consistent with this approach, the dissuasion panel has a
good deal of flexibility in terms of how it will handle cases where
an individual appears to have an abuse or addiction problem. If,
however, the panel determines that an offender is a nonaddicted
consumer of drugs with no prior offenses, the law requires it to
suspend proceedings and impose no sanction. This is the result
in approximately 80 percent of all proceedings. Of course, in these cases the panel still has the opportunity to talk with and advise the individual about drug addiction and abuse issues as part
of the meeting.
For offenders who do not fall into the dismissal category, the
panels can take a range of action, including issuing a warning to
the offender, requiring the offender to check in with the panel at
specified times, ordering the offender to enter into a treatment
program, and even banning the offender from visiting certain
places or associating with certain people. The panels can also
impose a fine, but the law provides that fines are to be imposed
as a last resort. The more common course with regard to a fine is
that a panel may order treatment or some other sanction along
10 Offender is somewhat of a misnomer for individuals who appear before the dissuasion commission but will be used here for the sake of simplicity.
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with a fine, but suspend the fine contingent upon meeting the
required treatment. Because drug possession has been decriminalized, the panels cannot, under any circumstances, impose
prison sentences or even send someone to treatment through civilcommitment-instead fines are the only mechanism for enforcing compliance with orders to seek treatment.
Portugal's decriminalization law was, perhaps unsurprisingly, strongly criticized by United States and United Nations drug
enforcement officials and in the international press. Critics worried that the country would become a destination for "drug tourism."10 9 Nearly ten years later, however, these fears have not
been realized and Portugal's program appears to have been quite
successful at reducing the harms associated with drug use in a
cost-effective manner. 11 0 A 2009 CATO Institute Report on Portugal's decriminalization policy by Glenn Greenwald concluded
that "usage has declined in many key categories and drugrelated social ills have been far more contained in a decriminalized regime."' 1 There has, for example, been a substantial decline in HIV infections among drug users, with instances of new
cases dropping from 1,400 to 400.112 Likewise, drug overdose
deaths dropped from 400 to 290.113 Meanwhile, the reforms have
helped to alleviate some of the burdens on Portugal's criminal
justice system and contributed to progress in addressing prison
overcrowding. 114 The savings in criminal justice spending has
allowed Portugal to increase its treatment capacity and helped
lead to a 147 percent increase in the number of people in substitution treatment from 1999 to 2003.115
Jodo Castel-Branco Goulio, the director of Portugal's principal drug policy agency-the Instituto da Droga e da Toxicodependncia-is careful to emphasize that he does not believe decriminalization by itself has been the driving force behind the
109 See Treating, Not Punishing: Portugal'sDrug Policy, The Economist 43 (Aug 29,
2009) (summarizing some of the early reactions against Portugal's law).
110 See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009 168, online at
http;//www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_engweb.pdf (visited Oct 3,
2010) (noting that "Portugal's policy has reportedly not led to an increase in drug tourism" but also noting some controversial points such as an increased murder rate which
may or may not be tied to the drug policy).
I Greenwald, Drug Decriminalizationin Portugalat 11 (cited in note 1).
112 Id at 16 (mentioning that increased usage of needle exchange programs may be a
possible explanation for the reduction in new HIV cases).
113 Id at 17.
114 See Hughes and Stevens, Effects of Decriminalizationat 4 (cited in note 107).
115 Id at 2.
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successes of Portugal's model. 116 Rather, in his view, decriminalization has provided Portugal with a framework for the noncriminal dissuasion commission system to operate and to treat drug
supply and demand as distinct problems. 117 By detaching drug
use from the criminal justice system and treating the issue
through a civil system, Portugal was able to create an atmosphere in which addiction is viewed purely as a medical and pub118
lic health problem.
B.

Comparing Civil Drug Courts to Criminal Drug Courts

While the available studies indicate that Portugal's decriminalization law has been successful on its own terms, there has
been little discussion of what the benefits and drawbacks of such
a system might be in comparison to other approaches. 119 In this
section, I will argue that a civil drug court system similar to Portugal's, in which possession of personal-use quantities of drugs
has been decriminalized and those found in possession are given
medical consultations before civil panels, is likely to be more cost
effective than our current criminal drug court model. Specifically, a civil drug court system would have the potential to address
the key inefficiencies inherent in criminal justice-based treatment programs, while retaining most, if not all, of the benefits of
criminal drug courts. While this assessment is speculative by its
nature, there would seem to be strong reasons for states that are
interested in reducing criminal justice costs and expanding criminal drug court programs to consider decriminalizing drugs and
implementing a civil drug court system, even if only on a trial
basis.
A civil drug court like Portugal's model would remedy the
overinclusiveness problem of spending treatment resources on
those who do not need them. When drug courts are incorporated
within the criminal justice system, drug court treatment programs exist only as an alternative to the traditional penalty the
offender would otherwise face. As a result, drug defendants who
do not have an abuse or addiction problem often have a strong
incentive to enter into treatment through drug courts whether or
116 Interview with Joio Castel-Branco Goulio (cited in note 107).
117 Id.
118 Id.

119 Glenn Greenwald's report, for example, considers the effects of Portugal's policy in
comparison to drug usage trends in other countries though does not discuss in detail why
Portugal's policy may be more effective than other approaches. See Greenwald, Drug
Decriminalizationin Portugalat 19-27 (cited in note 1).
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not they truly need it. Moving drug courts from the criminal to
civil system would squarely address this problem by allowing the
court or treatment panel to base the outcome in each case entirely on the individual's treatment needs. 120 Those without abuse or
addiction problems-who constitute a substantial majority of
offenders 12'--could be sent on their way with nothing more than
a warning and a consultation, accompanied by information about
the benefits of cessation and how to recognize the early signs of
addiction in their own behavior. Nonaddicted defendants, in
turn, would no longer have an incentive to exaggerate their drug
use. Because there are few, if any, conceivable benefits from
treating or punishing individuals in this category of offenders,
this would yield substantial cost savings over criminal drug
courts while incurring minimal additional costs.
At the same time, a decriminalized drug court model could
also address the underinclusiveness in criminal drug courts by
providing the significant number of individuals who are currently arrested for a drug offense but do not have an incentive to go
to criminal drug courts with treatment options that actually provide some benefit to both the offender and society. In 2002, for
example, there were 1.5 million drug arrests, 77 percent of which
were for simple possession.122 Under the criminal drug court system, the vast majority of those arrested either will not have a
sufficient incentive to participate, or will not be eligible to participate, in a drug court program. Many may simply receive probation or have the proceeding continued without a finding. 12 3 As a
result, a drug offender might face multiple arrests and convictions before she receives treatment or even addiction counseling.
Still other defendants may opt for a jail sentence after being advised not to risk entering drug court and ending up with a longer
120 See, for example, 0 Instituto da Droga e da Toxicodependbncia de Portugal,
Executive Summary of The National Plan Against Drugs and Drug Addiction 2005-2012
6 (2005), online at httpV/www.idt.pVPT/RelacoesInternacionai/Documents/Documentos
Ingles/2008/12/NPAD.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (explaining the Portuguese system's principle that "[i]nterventions for substance abuse are not an end in themselves, so they
shouldn't focus on the substances but rather on the individual and on his/her objective
and subjective needs").
121 See NACDL Report at 47 (cited in note 32) ("The vast majority of first-time offenders do not have a drug addiction that requires the intensive approach of drug courts.").
122 Justice Policy Institute, The Vortex: The ConcentratedRacial Impact of Drug Imprisonment and the Characteristicsof Punitive Countries 6 (2007), online at http;//www.
justicepolicy.orgfanages/upload/07-12_REPVortexAC-DP.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
123 See Lauren E. Glaze and Thomas P. Bonczar, Probationand Parole in the United
States, 2008 33 (Dec 2009), online at http//bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus08.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010) (reporting that in 2008 there were 646,493 people on probation in the
US for a drug offense).
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sentence following a drug treatment failure. The result is a
treatment gap in which many individuals who are arrested for
drug offenses and in need of treatment will not have access to it.
A civil drug court model would address this issue by sending everyone found in possession of a personal-use amount of illegal
drugs directly to a treatment panel. Because of the flexibility in a
decriminalized drug court system, civil drug courts would be well
positioned to provide beneficial services to individuals at risk of
developing an addiction or abuse problem in addition to those
who already have one. As a result, civil drug courts could be both
a place for coordinating treatment for addicts and for intervening
to help prevent casual experimentation from leading to abuse or
addiction.
At the same time, a civil drug court system would likely be
less expensive to administer than criminal drug courts. Removing possession of small quantities of drugs from the criminal
sphere would result in a significant decrease in police and court
resources that are currently used to process offenders through
the initial stages of the criminal justice system. Under a civil
drug court system, there would be no need to arrest offenders,
124
make charging decisions, appoint public defenders, or set bail.
Instead, those found in possession of drugs could be issued a citation, similar to a traffic ticket, to appear before a civil drug
treatment panel or court. This would have an added benefit of
eliminating the negative economic impact attendant to an arrest
in the form of disruptions to work and family life. 125 To be sure,
civil drug court panels similar to Portugal's-with two medical or
treatment professionals and one attorney-would be costly to
run. However, it is likely that the cost of administering a civil
drug court and criminal drug court would be comparable, and the
civil fines themselves can help offset the costs.
While the flexibility of a decriminalized drug court system
may provide some substantial benefits over the rigidity of our
current criminal drug court model, critics may counter that any
124 For a discussion of the impact on enforcement costs of Massachusetts's decriminalization of marijuana, see Jeffrey A. Miron, The Effect of MarijuanaDecriminalizationon
the Budgets of Massachusetts Governments, with a Discussion of Decriminalization's
Effect on Marijuana Use: An Update of Miron (2002a) 5-6 (2008), online at
(visited
http//www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/miron/files/decrimupdate_2007.pdf
Oct 3, 2010) (estimating that decriminalizing marijuana in Massachusetts would save 1.9
percent of all police expenditures, or $29.5 million annually).
125 See OT'ear, 20 Stan L & Pol Rev at 473 (cited in note 61) ("An arrest alone can
significantly disrupt family and work life, especially for defendants who are unable to
post bail and are thereby forced to endure several days or weeks of pretrial detention.").
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benefits from addressing the over- and underinclusiveness problems discussed above would be outweighed by losses from remov1 26
ing the deterrent value of the criminal justice system.
Deterrence-based objections to a civil drug court system might
proceed on two fronts. First, some might argue that removing
criminal penalties for possession of small amounts of drugs
would lead to an increase in new and casual drug users who may
presently be dissuaded by the possibility of criminal punishment. 27 Second, some might argue that treatment courts will not
be as effective if judges are unable to deter bad behavior through
the use of short jail stints to punish those who slip up or the
threat of a prison sentence for those who fail the programs en128
tirely.
The fear that decriminalization may lead to an increase in
use, particularly by new users, while understandable in theory,
is belied by the experience in Portugal. In the decade since
Portugal enacted its decriminalization policy, drug use rates in
the country have largely remained stable or declined.129 Use
rates among the key demographics of thirteen to fifteen-year-olds
and sixteen to eighteen-year-olds fell by approximately 4 and 6
percent respectively in the years following decriminalization in
Portugal. 130 These results are also consistent with the experiences of states and countries that have decriminalized possession of
small amounts of marijuana. In their landmark book Drug War
Heresies, Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter theorize that decriminalization may not lead to an increase in drug usage because, among other reasons, it does not affect important deterrence metrics including drug price and availability. 13' In sum,
there is little reason to think that enacting a system like Portu126 See, for example, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Coerced Abstinence: A NeopaternalistDrug
Policy Initiative, in Lawrence M. Mead, ed, The New Paternalism (Brookings Institution
1997).
127 See Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence,6 J Gender
Race & Just 111, 116 (2002) ("There must be a significant number of people who would
like to use drugs, or who would use them more frequently, but do not because of the fear
of arrest or because they simply obey laws.").
128 See National Institute of Justice, Drug Courts: The Second Decade at 3 (cited in
note 35) (listing the use of sanctions and rewards as one of the 10 key components to a
successful drug court program).
129 See Greenwald, DrugDecriminalizationin Portugalat 11 (cited in note 1).
130 Id at 11-12.

131 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies at 76-98 (cited in note 62). See also
Louisa Degenhardt, et al, 5 PLoS Medicine at 1057 Table 2, 1065 (cited in note 17) (comparing drug usage rates across countries and finding that "countries with more stringent
policies toward illegal drug use did not have lower levels of such drug use than countries
with more liberal policies").
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gal's would lead to any increase in drug usage, let alone a significant one.
The argument that removing drug courts' access to criminal
sanctions will diminish their ability to incentivize treatment is a
more serious and realistic concern. For example, in his insightful
book When Brute Force Fails, Mark Kleiman points to the successes of an innovative probation program in Hawaii as evidence
that a regime with increased drug testing and criminal sanctions
may be more effective that current models that focus on treatment at the outset. 132 In the program, named Hawaii's
Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE), a state judge
tired of probation violations put problem probationers on a strict
program in which any violation-from a failed drug test to a
missed appointment-would result in an immediate but short
jail sentence. 133 The results were impressive, with a decrease of
over 90 percent in the violation rates of program participants
and rearrest rates less than half than the comparison group.
Kleiman argues that the lesson to be learned from Project HOPE
is that successful diversion programs should include "frequent
[drug] tests and quick and consistent sanctions for failure to
comply."1 34
Although the HOPE program persuasively demonstrates
that sanctions can be a successful tool for problem probationers,
evidence on the effectiveness of sanctions in drug court programs
remains inconsistent. 13 5 While some studies have shown sanctions to be effective, others have found that they have little, if
any, effect. 136 A study in Clark County, Nevada, for example,
even indicated that imposing sanctions was associated with
37
higherrearrest rates and lower graduation rates.'
The inconsistent evidence may be due, in part, to differences
in the make-up of offenders in the studies. 138 Specifically, sanctions for failed drug tests might be expected to be more effective
in deterring use in programs that include large percentages of
individuals without drug abuse or addiction problems. This is
132 See Kleiman, Brute Force at 34-41, 163 (cited in note 27).
Id.
134 Id at 163.
135 See King and Pasquarella, Drug Courts at 9-12 (cited in note 46).
136 Id at 11-12 (summarizing the literature and finding that "[tihe data on sanctions
presents a mixed picture").
133

137 Id at 11.

138 Another factor complicating study of how the use of sanctions affects drug court
success is that "many [drug] courts do not have a formal system under which sanctions
are imposed, nor are records kept for when and why sanctions are enforced." Id at 10.
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because those without addiction or abuse problems are better
able to abstain from drug use and more likely to respond more
rationally to threats of punishment than are addicts.1 39 In assessing the implications of the HOPE program and the usefulness of sanctions, then, it is important to consider that HOPE's
participants were not primarily drug offenders, but rather felony
probationers who had been convicted of a wide range of offenses-from sexual assault and burglary to drug dealing-and were
facing five- to ten-year prison terms. 140 Likewise, the program's
aim was to reduce probation violations, not address substance
abuse or addiction problems.1 4 1 Accordingly, while HOPE provides strong evidence that incorporating swift and certain sanctions for probation violations is an effective method for deterring
such violations and recidivism among serious felony offenders, it
does not necessarily mean that the availability of sanctions provides better outcomes among drug court populations. This is not
to say that sanctions may not be an effective method for persuading some drug addicts to stay on track in drug court programs,
only that we should be careful not to overstate their importance.
Even if we grant that the deterrent effect of sanctions is likely to help some drug court participants stay on track, civil drug
courts may offer other benefits that would counter the loss of a
deterrent effect and leave treatment success rates unchanged. In
particular, a civil drug court system modeled after Portugal's
might be able to achieve better outcomes for some participants
than a coercion-based system. There is a wealth of evidence that
indicates internal motivation to be a strong predictor of treatment success and reveals that voluntary treatment is more successful than compulsory treatment. 142 There is good reason to
believe that a decriminalized civil drug court system, in which
addicts meet with a treatment panel to determine the outcome in
their cases, would be better positioned to convince participants
that they need treatment than a criminal system in which their
139 See Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 808-18 (cited in note 69) (discussing the irrationality of addicts' behavior); id at 826-27 (arguing that many studies purporting to show that
coerced treatment is effective have been "methodologically unsound" because "the unaddicted skew upward the success rates of coerced treatment regimes").
140 Kleiman, Brute Force at 34 (cited in note 27).
141

Id.

142 See Bowers, 55 UCLA L Rev at 825-27 (cited in note 69) (providing an overview of
the evidence that "voluntary treatment [is] superior to compulsory treatment"). See also
Morris B. Hoffman, The RehabilitativeIdeal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 Fed Sent Rep
172, 173 (2001-2002) (arguing that coerced treatment is not more effective than voluntary treatment).
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participation is based entirely on external coercion. Rather than
facing a judge who is mandating sobriety as evidenced by clean
drug tests, an offender would meet with treatment professionals
who would have the opportunity to discuss his use and convince
him that he is in need of treatment. If civil drug courts are successful at inspiring internal motivation among participants, the
benefits from that effect may balance any possible negative consequences from the loss of criminal sanctions as a deterrent tool.
And, while a civil system would remove the availability of jail
sanctions, sanctions in the form of fines or other civil remedies
would remain an option in the event of noncompliance. Finally,
we must keep in mind that jail sanctions are not cost free. Indeed, they are quite expensive, both in terms of the direct costs of
incarceration and the collateral costs of disrupting the treatment
client's social bonds and ability to maintain employment.
Even if those who argue that eliminating criminal sanctions
would decrease the overall rate of success among treatment participants are correct, the benefits of addressing the over- and
underinclusiveness problems inherent in a criminal drug court
system might still make a civil drug court system more efficient
overall. Solving those problems would result in substantial cost
savings by ensuring treatment resources are not wasted on those
who do not need treatment. It would also dramatically expand
the net of drug users who have the opportunity to consult with
treatment professionals. By sending all users directly to a treatment panel, we could expect to see dramatic long-term savings
through "brief interventions" that reach casual users before they
have become addicted, 143 as well as treatment of addicts who may
not have a sufficient incentive to enter a drug court in a criminal
system. Thus, even if the success rate for treatment in a civil
drug court system were lower than in a criminal drug court system, the significantly larger pool of individuals receiving treatment consultations in a civil system, in combination with the
savings achieved by removing nonaddicts from costly treatment
programs, make a compelling case for the proposition that civil
drug courts are likely be more cost effective than criminal drug
courts.

143 For a discussion of screening and brief interventions in the medical setting, see
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Screening and Brief Intervention (2008), online at
http//www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/screen-briefintv.pdf (visited Oct
3, 2010).

336

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
CONCLUSION

After a forty-year-long war on drugs, it is becoming politically fashionable again to say that drug abuse should be treated as
a public health problem, at least when addressing drug demand.
This is a welcome development. Moving toward such an approach
would not only save governments money, but it would also
achieve better results than does our current system. In this
Article, I have argued that the best way to treat drug addiction
as a public health problem is to end the criminalization of drug
use and addiction entirely and enact a civil drug court system
similar to Portugal's. I argue that a system like Portugal's is likely to be more effective and less expensive than the criminal drug
court model that has proven popular here in the United States.
As states look to cut corrections costs, then, they would be wise
to give serious consideration to the alternative of a decriminalized civil drug court system.
In making this argument, I have focused on costs and benefits in a somewhat narrow sense by leaving out the noneconomic
benefits that we might also arguably see from decriminalization,
such as a heightened respect for individual autonomy. Instead,
my focus has been on the more discrete costs and benefits of civil
and criminal drug courts. Admittedly, my reasoning and conclusions are only speculative in nature. Whether or not a model like
Portugal's would actually be more cost effective than criminal
drug courts is an empirical question that we cannot yet answer.
The costs of Portugal's program and the success rates of individuals referred to treatment through that program, in particular,
would be useful to study in greater depth. Whether or not readers are ultimately persuaded that a civil drug court model is
preferable to criminal drug courts, I hope that the reasoning outlined above at least helps to urge additional detailed investigations into Portugal's decriminalization law.

